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V irtually all aspects of economic activity–individ-
ual consumption, business investment, and govern-
ment spending–affect greenhouse gas emissions
and, hence, the global climate. An effective climate
change policy would change the decision calculus
for these activities to promote more ef½cient gen-
eration and use of energy, lower carbon-intensity
of energy, and a more carbon-lean economy. There
are three ways to accomplish this goal: (1) mandate
that businesses and individuals change their tech-
nology and emissions performance; (2) subsidize
business and individual investment in and use of
lower-emitting goods and services; or (3) price the
greenhouse gas externality commensurate with the
harm that such emissions impose on society. 
Externality pricing can promote cost-effective
abatement, deliver ef½cient innovation incentives,
avoid picking technology winners, and ameliorate,
not exacerbate, government ½scal conditions. When
all businesses and households face a common price
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Abstract: Emissions of greenhouse gases linked with global climate change are affected by diverse aspects
of economic activity, including individual consumption, business investment, and government spending.
An effective climate policy will have to modify the decision calculus for these activities in the direction of
more ef½cient generation and use of energy, lower carbon-intensity of energy, and a more carbon-lean
economy. The only technically feasible and cost-effective approach to achieving this goal on a meaningful
scale is carbon pricing: that is, market-based climate policies that place a shadow-price on carbon dioxide
emissions. We examine alternative designs of three such instruments: carbon taxes, cap and trade, and
clean energy standards. We note that the U.S. political response to possible market-based approaches to
climate policy has been, and will continue to be, largely a function of issues and structural factors that
transcend the scope of environmental and climate policy.per unit of greenhouse gases embodied in
fuels, goods, and services, no additional
policies can lower the total cost of achiev-
ing a speci½ed climate policy goal. By
pricing carbon pollution, the govern-
ment defers to private ½rms and individ-
uals to ½nd and exploit the lowest-cost
ways to reduce emissions and to invest 
in the development of new technologies,
processes, and ideas that could mitigate
future emissions. A variety of policy ap-
proaches fall within the concept of exter-
nality pricing, including carbon taxes, cap
and trade, and clean energy standards. 
In contrast, the conventional approach
to environmental policy employs uniform
mandates to protect environmental qual-
ity. Although uniform technology and per-
formance standards have been effective in
achieving some established environmen-
tal goals and standards, they tend to lead
to non-cost-effective outcomes in which
some ½rms use unduly expensive means to
control pollution. In addition, convention-
al technology or performance standards
do not provide dynamic incentives for the
development, adoption, and diffusion of
environmentally and economically supe-
rior control technologies. Oncea ½rm sat-
is½es a performance standard, it has little
incentive to develop or adopt cleaner tech-
nology. Indeed, regulated ½rms may fear
that if they adopt a superior technology,
the government may tighten the standard.
Given the ubiquitous nature of green-
house gas emissions from diverse sources,
it is virtually inconceivable that a stan-
dards-based approach could form the cen-
terpiece of a meaningful climate policy.
The substantially higher cost of a stan-
dards-based policy may undermine sup-
port for such an approach, and securing
political support may require weakening
standards and lowering environmental
bene½ts. 
Government support for lower-emitting
technologies often takes the form of in-
vestment or performance subsidies. Pro-
viding subsidies for targeting climate-
friendly technologies entails revenues
raised by taxing other economic activi-
ties (either contemporaneously or in the
future, with contemporaneous ½nancing
via de½cit spending). Given the tight ½s-
cal environment throughout the developed
world, it is dif½cult to justify increasing (or
even continuing) the subsidies that would
be necessary to change signi½cantly the
emissions intensity of economic activity. 
Furthermore, by lowering the cost of
energy, climate-oriented technology sub-
sidies likely result in socially excessive
levels of energy supply and consumption.
Thus, subsidies can undermine incentives
for ef½ciency and conservation and im-
pose higher costs per ton abated than
cost-effective policy alternatives. In prac-
tice, subsidies are typically designed to be
technology speci½c. By designating tech-
nology winners, such an approach yields
a special-interest constituency focused on
maintaining subsidies beyond what may
be socially desirable. It also provides little
incentive for the development of novel,
game-changing technologies.
In contrast, real-world experience dem-
onstrates the power of markets to drive
changes in the investment and use of
emission-intensive technologies. The run-
up in gasoline prices in 2008 increased
consumer demand for more fuel-ef½cient
new cars and trucks, while also reducing
vehicle miles traveled by the existing fleet.1
Likewise, electric utilities responded to
the dramatic decline in natural gas prices
(and decline in the relative gas-coal price)
in 2009 and 2010 by dispatching more
electricity from gas plants, resulting in
lower carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
and the lowest share of U.S. power gen-
eration by coal in some four decades.2
Longer-term evaluations of the impacts
of energy prices on markets have found
that higher prices have induced more
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importance of patents–and increased
the commercial availability of more en-
ergy-ef½cient products, especially among
energy-intensive goods such as air con-
ditioners and water heaters.3
Real-world experience with policies that
price externalities illustrates the effec-
tiveness of market-based instruments.
So-called congestion charges in London,
Singapore, and Stockholm have reduced
traf½c congestion in busy urban centers,
lowered air pollution, and delivered net
social bene½ts. The British Columbia car-
bon tax has reduced carbon dioxide emis-
sions since 2008. The U.S. sulfur dioxide
(SO2) cap-and-trade program has cut
SO2emissions from U.S. power plants by
more than 50 percent since 1990, result-
ing in compliance costs one-half of what
they would have been under convention-
al regulatory mandates.4 The success of
the SO2allowance trading program moti-
vated the design and implementation of
the European Union’s Emissions Trading
Scheme (euets), the world’s largest cap-
and-trade program, focused on cutting
CO2 emissions from power plants and
large manufacturing facilities through-
out Europe.5The 1980s phasedown of lead
in gasoline, which reduced the lead con-
tent per gallon of fuel, served as an early,
effective example of a tradable perfor-
mance standard.6 These positive exper-
iences provide motivation to consider
market-based instruments–carbon taxes,
cap and trade, and clean energy standards
–as potential approaches to mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions.
In principle, government imposition of
a carbon tax represents the simplest way
to price greenhouse gas emissions.7 The
government could set a tax in terms of
dollars per ton of CO2-equivalent on
greenhouse gas emissions from all sourc-
es covered by the tax. To be cost effective,
such a tax would cover all sources, and to
be ef½cient, the carbon price would be set
equal to the marginal bene½ts of emis-
sion reduction: that is, the social cost of
carbon.8An ef½cient carbon tax would be
expected to increase over time to reflect
the fact that as more greenhouse gas emis-
sions accumulate in the atmosphere, the
incremental damage from an additional
ton of CO2 becomes greater; such a tax
would also include a risk premium to re-
duce uncertain future damages.9 Impos-
ing a carbon tax would provide certainty
about the marginal cost of compliance,
thereby reducing uncertainty about re-
turns to investment decisions, but would
leave economy-wide emissions uncertain. 
The government could apply the car-
bon tax “upstream” on fossil fuel suppli-
ers based on the carbon content of fuels
or “downstream” on ½nal emitters at the
point of combustion, or it could employ 
a hybrid of the two. In an upstream ap-
proach, re½neries and importers would
pay a tax based on the carbon content of
their gasoline, diesel fuel, or heating oil;
coal mine operators would pay a tax re-
flecting the carbon content of extracted
coal; and natural gas companies would
pay a tax reflecting the carbon content of
their gas production and imports. Focus-
ing on the carbon content of fuels would
cover about 98 percent of U.S. CO2 emis-
sions through a relatively small number
of ½rms–two to three thousand–as op-
posed to the hundreds of millions of
smokestacks and tailpipes, for example,
that emit CO2after fossil fuel combustion.
Such a tax approach could also cover other
greenhouse gases.
A carbon tax would be administratively
simple and straightforward to implement.
The tax could incorporate existing meth-
ods for fuel-supply monitoring and report-
ing to the regulatory authority. Given the
molecular properties of fossil fuels, mon-
itoring their physical quantities yields a
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lease during combustion. Because an emis-
sion tax would be similar in form to taxes
that many fuel suppliers already pay,10
½rms could easily understand and account
for it in their operations. 
A crediting system for downstream se-
questration could complement the emis-
sion tax system. A ½rm that captures and
stores CO2 through geological sequestra-
tion, thereby preventing the gas from
entering the atmosphere, could generate
CO2tax credits. Similar approaches could
be undertaken to promote biological se-
questration in forestry and agriculture and,
potentially, emission-reduction projects
(“offsets”) in other countries. 
Faced with an emission tax, fuel suppli-
ers will increase the cost of the fuels they
sell. This will effectively pass down the
tax through the energy system, creating
incentives for fuel-switching and invest-
ments in more energy-ef½cient technolo-
gies. The impact of a carbon tax on emis-
sion mitigation and the economy will de-
pend in part on the amount and use of the
tax revenue. An economy-wide U.S. car-
bon tax of $20 per ton of CO2would like-
ly raise more than $100 billion per year.
The revenue could allow for reductions in
existing distortionary taxes on labor and
capital, thereby stimulating economic ac-
tivity and offsetting some of the policy’s
costs. For example, reducing the payroll
tax by 2 percentage points in 2012 could
be ½nanced with an economy-wide car-
bon tax on the order of $15 to $20 per ton
of CO2. Other socially valuable uses of rev-
enue include reducing the federal de½cit,
funding energy R&D, and compensating
low-income households for the burden of
higher energy prices.
The implementation of a carbon tax (or
cap-and-trade system) will increase the
cost of consuming energy and could
adversely affect the competitiveness of
energy-intensive industries. This competi-
tiveness effect can result in negative eco-
nomic and environmental outcomes: ½rms
may relocate facilities to countries without
meaningful climate change policies, there-
by increasing emissions in these new lo-
cations and offsetting some of the envi-
ronmental bene½ts of the policy. Because
a majority of developed countries’ emis-
sions occur in non-traded sectors–that is,
electricity, transportation, and residential
buildings–this so-called emission leakage
may, in fact, be relatively modest. How-
ever, energy-intensive manufacturing in-
dustries that produce goods competing 
in international markets may face incen-
tives to relocate. 
Additional emission leakage may occur
through international energy markets. As
countries with climate policies reduce
their consumption of fossil fuels and drive
down fuel prices, those countries without
emission mitigation policies may be in-
duced to increase their consumption. The
fact that leakage undermines the environ-
mental effectiveness of any unilateral
effort to mitigate emissions makes inter-
national cooperation and coordination all
the more important. 
A cap-and-trade system constrains the
aggregate emissions of regulated sources
by creating a limited number of tradable
emission allowances–in sum equal to the
overall cap–and requiring those sources to
surrender allowances to cover their emis-
sions.11 Faced with the choice of surren-
dering an allowance or reducing emis-
sions, ½rms place a value on the allow-
ance reflecting the cost of the emission
reductions that can be avoided by surren-
dering the allowance. Regardless of the
initial allowance distribution, trading can
lead allowances to be put toward their
highest-valued use: covering those emis-
sions that are the most costly to reduce
and providing the incentive to undertake
the least costly reductions. 
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policy-makers must decide on several ele-
ments of the system’s design. First, they
must determine how many allowances to
issue (that is, the level of the emission cap)
and the scope of the cap’s coverage, iden-
tifying the types of greenhouse gas emis-
sions and sources covered as well as
deciding whether to regulate upstream
(based on carbon content of fuels) or
downstream (based on monitored emis-
sions). Policy-makers must then deter-
mine whether to freely distribute or auc-
tion allowances. Free allowance alloca-
tion could be “grandfathered,” reflecting
some historical record such as recent fos-
sil fuel sales. Grandfathering involves a
transfer of wealth, equal to the value of
the allowances, to existing ½rms, whereas
an auction transfers the same level of
wealth to the government. In theory, the
government would collect revenue iden-
tical to that from a tax producing the same
amount of emission abatement. As with
tax receipts, auction revenues could be
used to reduce distortionary taxes or ½-
nance other programs. 
In an emission-trading program, cost
uncertainty–unexpectedly high or vola-
tile allowance prices–can undermine
political support for climate policy and
discourage investment in new technolo-
gies and R&D. Therefore, attention has
turned to incorporating the “cost con-
tainment” measures of offsets, allowance
banking and borrowing, safety valves, and
price collars in cap-and-trade systems. 
An offset provision allows regulated
entities to offset some of their emissions
with credits from emission-reduction
measures outside the cap-and-trade sys-
tem’s scope of coverage. Allowance bank-
ing and borrowing effectively permits
emission trading across time. The flexi-
bility to save an allowance for future use
(banking) or to bring a future period
allowance forward for current use (bor-
rowing) promotes cost-effective abate-
ment and rede½nes a series of annual
emission caps as a cap on cumulative emis-
sions over a period of years.
A safety valve puts an upper bound on
the costs that ½rms will incur to meet an
emission cap by offering the option of pur-
chasing additional allowances at a pre-
determined price. This effective price
ceiling reflects a hybrid approach: a cap-
and-trade system that transitions to a tax
in the presence of unexpectedly high mit-
igation costs. When ½rms exercise a safe-
ty valve, their aggregate emissions exceed
the emission cap. A price collar combines
the ceiling of a safety valve with a price
floor created, for example, by a reserve
price in allowance auctions.
Increasing certainty about mitigation
cost reduces certainty about the quantity
of emissions. Smoothing allowance prices
over time through banking and borrow-
ing reduces emission certainty in any giv-
en year but maintains certainty of aggre-
gate emissions over a longer time period.
A cost-effective policy with a mechanism
insuring against unexpectedly high costs
increases the likelihood that ½rms will
comply with their obligations and can fa-
cilitate a country’s participation and com-
pliance in a global climate agreement.
As with a carbon tax, cap-and-trade pro-
grams could include some variant of a bor-
der tax to mitigate the competitiveness
impacts of domestic climate policy and
encourage trade partners to take on com-
parable mitigation policies. Border mea-
sures under a carbon tax or cap and trade
raise policy questions about the applica-
tion of a trade “stick” to encourage broad-
er and more extensive emission mitigation
actions globally, as well as questions about
their legality under the World Trade
Organization.12
T he purpose of a clean energy standard is
to establish a technology-oriented goal for
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mented cost effectively.13Under such stan-
dards, power plants generating power with
technologies that satisfy the standard
create tradable credits that they can sell
to power plants that fail to meet the stan-
dard, thereby minimizing the costs of
meeting the standard’s goal in a manner
analogous to cap and trade. An important
distinction is that cap and trade establishes
the policy goal in terms of the externality
(greenhouse gas emissions), while clean
energy standards establish the policy goal
in terms of a set of technologies with zero-
or low-emission characteristics. 
For example, state renewable electrici-
ty standards, a restricted type of a clean
energy standard, typically identify the ob-
jective of the standard as a speci½c renew-
able share of total power generation (that
increases over time).14 A few states have
implemented alternative energy stan-
dards that target renewables, new nucle-
ar capacity, and advanced fossil fuel tech-
nologies. Proposals for national stan-
dards have targeted a combination of all
generating technologies except conven-
tional coal.15
Clean energy standards that focus on
technology targets do not explicitly price
the greenhouse gas externality and thus
impose a higher cost for a given amount
of emission reductions than a carbon tax
or cap-and-trade program. A renewable
mandate treats coal-½red power, gas-
½red power, and nuclear power as equiv-
alent–none of these technologies create
credits necessary for compliance–and
therefore provides no incentive to switch
from emission-intensive coal to emission-
lean gas or emission-free nuclear. 
A more cost-effective approach to a clean
energy standard would employ a technol-
ogy-neutral performance standard, such
as tons of CO2per megawatt hour of gen-
eration (tCO2/MWh). Given that all pow-
er sources, from fossil fuels to renewables,
could be eligible under such a perfor-
mance standard, this approach would pro-
vide better innovation incentives than a
renewable portfolio approach and would
enable all possible ways of reducing the
emission intensity of power generation.
The Canadian province of Alberta has em-
ployed a tradable carbon performance
standard for most large sources of CO2
emissions, requiring a 12 percent improve-
ment in these sources’ emission intensity
since 2007. 
Power plants would be awarded credits
for generating cleaner (less emission-
intensive) electricity than the standard,
and they could sell these credits to other
power plants or save them for future use.
Tradable credits promote cost-effective-
ness by encouraging the greatest deploy-
ment of clean energy from those plants
that can lower their emission intensity at
lowest cost. Clean power plants could then
sell their extra credits to other plants that
face higher costs for deploying clean en-
ergy. The creation and sale of clean energy
credits would provide a revenue stream
that could conceivably enable the ½nanc-
ing of low- and zero-emission power
plant projects.
Eligible technologies for the standard
could extend beyond generation technolo-
gies, permitting improvements in energy
ef½ciency and emission-offset activities
to create tradable credits. Extending the
carbon price to a broader set of activities
could improve cost-effectiveness, but
there are risks in allowing for energy ef-
½ciency and other offsets. In both cases,
estimating the offset is complex, requires
extensive review and monitoring by reg-
ulators, and risks undermining the objec-
tive of a clean energy standard if some
projects do not, in practice, deliver mean-
ingful emission reductions. 
Monitoring and enforcement would be
relatively straightforward, given that reg-
ulators already track electricity generation
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A power plant could demonstrate com-
pliance through a combination of the fol-
lowing approaches: (1) the plant has less-
er or equal emissions per megawatt hour
than the standard (or a share of power
from clean energy exceeding the stan-
dard); (2) the plant purchases clean energy
credits from other power plants; or (3) the
plant purchases additional clean energy
credits from the federal government at a
preset price. The last option is similar to
“alternative compliance payments” in
state electricity portfolio standards (and
akin to the hybrid safety-valve approach
under a cap-and-trade program) that ½-
nance some state energy R&D programs.
This approach could provide more cer-
tainty about compliance cost under a clean
energy standard.
A clean energy standard represents a 
de facto free allocation of the right to emit
greenhouse gases. Suppose that the fed-
eral government created a clean energy
performance standard of 0.5 tCO2/MWh
(in 2010, U.S. power sector emission in-
tensity was 0.56 tCO2/MWh). Every pow-
er plant implicitly receives the right to
emit a half-ton of CO2per megawatt hour
of generation under such a standard, sim-
ilar to an output-based allocation of emis-
sion allowances under cap and trade. 
Market-based policies can support
cost-effective attainment of policy goals. A
carbon tax and cap and trade establish a
common price for emitting a ton of CO2,
and the private sector has the flexibility
to identify and exploit the least costly ways
of reducing emissions. This approach is
vastly superior to command-and-control
regulatory mandates and can result in
lower costs per ton of CO2 abated than a
clean energy standard. Even a clean ener-
gy standard designed as a tradable carbon
performance standard would be less cost
effective than cap and trade or a tax be-
cause it does not provide a comparable
incentive for ef½ciency and conservation.
The implicit free allocation of the right to
emit is functionally an output-based sub-
sidy that will result in more electricity
generated and consumed than under cap
and trade or a tax. 
A renewable electricity standard is even
less cost effective because it proscribes
some low- and zero-emission technolo-
gies from the set of compliance options.
In theory, this type of standard could man-
date so much renewable power that it
spurs a socially excessive amount of total
generating capacity, lowers the price of
electricity (at least in the short run), and
causes a net increase in electricity con-
sumption, contrary to the ef½ciency and
conservation incentives under cost-effec-
tive approaches. 
Cost-effective implementation is nec-
essary but not suf½cient for a climate pol-
icy to maximize net social bene½ts. A
socially  ef½cient policy, one resulting in
marginal costs equal to marginal bene½ts
of emission reduction, would require set-
ting the carbon price equal to the esti-
mated social cost of carbon. Alternative-
ly, policy-makers could set an emission
cap that would deliver an expected allow-
ance price equal to the estimated social
cost of carbon. Under a clean energy stan-
dard, the stringency of the performance
standard could be set to yield expected
credit prices on par with the social cost of
carbon, although the weaker incentive for
ef½ciency and conservation would result
in some ef½ciency losses.
A market-based policy may raise revenue
to ½nance reductions in taxes that dis-
courage the supply of labor and capital.
Lowering payroll, income, or capital gains
tax rates could offset some of the costs of
a climate policy. A well-designed market-
based policy with a modest carbon price
and ef½ciently targeted reduction in tax
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increase in gdp, although–in practice–
the more likely outcome is some savings
in the policy’s cost.16 In general, recy-
cling revenue back into the economy by
lowering existing distortionary taxes can
allow for a more aggressive greenhouse
gas mitigation policy that maximizes net
social bene½ts.
In a world without uncertainty, a carbon
tax and a cap-and-trade program could
be designed and implemented to yield an
identical carbon price and emission re-
ductions. But the choice of policy instru-
ment can affect the net social bene½ts,
given the real-world uncertaintythat char-
acterizes emission mitigation.17The gov-
ernment must implement a climate poli-
cy before uncertainty about the cost of
emission mitigation can be resolved. If
mitigation costs are higher than the gov-
ernment expected, then the climate poli-
cy will yield either (a) fewer emission re-
ductions if the government implemented
a carbon tax; or (b) higher costs if the
government implemented cap and trade.
If the foregone economic bene½ts from
fewer emission reductions under the tax
are less than the higher costs under the
cap-and-trade program, then a tax would
be the preferred policy instrument under
uncertainty. Otherwise, cap and trade
would likely maximize net social bene½ts
relative to a carbon tax. 
Uncertainty about the price of carbon
inhibits private-sector investment. In re-
cent years, uncertainty about the type, de-
sign, and stringency of climate policy has
adversely affected new energy and climate-
related technology investment. Uncer-
tainty about future modi½cations to a 
climate policy may also deter investment,
especially for long-lived energy-related
capital. For example, a future government
could relax policy stringency (with a
lower carbon tax or higher emission cap)
that would lower the economic return to
low- and zero-carbon technology invest-
ments. Alternatively, under a cap-and-
trade regime, a future government could
wipe out the value of an emission allow-
ance bank (the allowances set aside and
banked for future use), increasing the
stringency of the cap-and-trade program,
not unlike recent experience with the ef-
fect of regulatory changes on the U.S. SO2
cap-and-trade program.
While the business community would
prefer cost certainty, the environmental
community favors certainty over green-
house gas emission levels. Placing much
greater weight on emission reductions re-
flects the concern of some in the environ-
mental community that business will sim-
ply “buy its way out” under a carbon tax
and fail to undertake emission mitigation,
even though it may be in businesses’ in-
terests to do so.
Real-world experience has addressed
uncertainty by pursuing hybrid price-
quantity approaches, such as state renew-
able electricity standards that establish
quantity renewable goals and include
alternative compliance payments that
serve as a price ceiling on tradable renew-
able credits. Such hybrid approaches can
provide insurance against policy costs
reaching unexpected heights. They may
also represent a way of imposing an im-
plicit carbon tax if a cap-and-trade pro-
gram’s safety valve is set at a level that has
a very high probability of being triggered.
Although public policies are frequently
proposed and analyzed in isolation, they
in fact interact with one another in a num-
ber of important ways, which can affect a
policy’s environmental effectiveness and
costs. Policies of all kinds–both market-
based instruments and conventional pol-
icies–act as implicit taxes and interact
with preexisting taxes in ways that drive
up the policies’ costs–the so-called tax-
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ment, including carbon taxes and cap and
trade with auctioned allowances, can ded-
icate part or all of their revenue to cutting
existing, distortionary taxes, thereby off-
setting some or (in principle) all of the
tax-interaction effect. These interactions
can have profound effects on the costs of
a climate policy.19
The interaction of flexible, quantity-
based policies, such as cap-and-trade sys-
tems and tradable clean energy standards,
with other climate policies introduces an
additional set of issues. In general, allowed
trading means that once a flexible, aver-
aging type of policy instrument is in place,
any attempt to elicit greater reductions
from some speci½c source or sector under
the cap will essentially be undone by some
other source or sector covered under the
cap. Moreover, when marginal abatement
costs at the speci½c source or sector are
increased, the overall flexible (cap and
trade) regime is no longer cost effective.
This is a major issue for cap-and-trade
systems, renewable electricity standards,
clean energy standards, and motor-vehi-
cle fuel ef½ciency standards. Problematic
interactions can occur when one policy
instrument is nested within another, as
with subnational and national policies,20
or when two policy instruments coexist
within the same political jurisdiction.21
The effects are potentially less severe with
a carbon tax than with quantity-based
policies because the multiple policies
could yield a lower emission level than
the carbon tax in isolation, but that ben-
e½t would come at the expense of cost
effectiveness.
Given that climate change and actions
to mitigate it play out in the global com-
mons, it is important that any U.S. policy
actions be carefully coordinated with the
actions or anticipated actions of other
countries. Otherwise, U.S. policies may
have no more than trivial environmental
impacts (despite their cost) and can in-
crease other countries’ emissions through
induced leakage of carbon-intensive eco-
nomic activity.
Cap-and-trade systems seem to have
emerged as the preferred national and
regional instrument for reducing green-
house gas emissions throughout much 
of the industrialized world. The Clean
Development Mechanism (cdm), an
international emission-reduction credit
system, has developed a substantial con-
stituency despite concerns about its per-
formance. Because linkage between trad-
able permit systems (that is, unilateral or
bilateral recognition of allowances from
one system for use in another) can reduce
compliance costs and improve market
liquidity, there is great interest in linking
cap-and-trade systems with each other,
as well as to the cdm and other credit
systems. There are not only bene½ts but
also concerns associated with various
types of linkages,22 but it is safe to say
that such linkage may play one of three
possible roles: as an independent bottom-
up international climate policy architec-
ture; as a step in the evolution of a top-
down architecture; or as an ongoing ele-
ment of a larger climate policy agreement.
A parallel issue arises with respect to
national or subnational carbon taxes:
namely, they can be linked in productive
ways. For purposes of overall cost effec-
tiveness, the various taxes would need to
be set at the same level, that is, harmo-
nized.23 The prospect of harmonization
is complicated by equity issues–would
developing countries harmonize taxes
without some form of side payments?–
and related tax issues: how might carbon
tax harmonization account for preexist-
ing energy subsidies in developing coun-
tries and high preexisting energy taxes in
some developed countries? 
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struments–both market-based and con-
ventional command-and-control–that
countries can employ to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions, it is important
to ask whether a diverse set of heteroge-
neous national, subnational, or regional
climate policy instruments can be linked
in productive ways. The simple answer is
that such a set of instruments can be
linked, although coordinating a set of more
homogeneous tradable permit systems
would be easier.24 The basic approach
behind emission-reduction credit systems
such as the cdmcan be extended to foster
linkage opportunities among diverse pol-
icy instruments, including cap and trade,
taxes, and certain regulatory systems.25
Countries could coordinate effectively
through the unilateral use of border ad-
justments. A national carbon tax, for in-
stance, would take the form of a tax on
imports equivalent to the implicit tax on
the same goods produced domestically.
In the cap-and-trade climate legislation
passed by the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives in 2009, border adjustments cov-
ered only a limited set of energy-inten-
sive, trade-exposed manufactured bulk
products.
P olitical factors are at the heart of policy
feasibility. In general, it may be necessary
to elicit support from concentrated inter-
ests.26A key question is whether the pro-
cess of developing such support reduces a
policy’s effectiveness (for example, by
muting the price signals of a market-
based instrument) or increases its cost.
Such outcomes are frequently the case.
However, a key merit of one of the policy
instruments we have considered–namely,
cap and trade–is that under many cir-
cumstances, the process of developing
political support need not impair the pol-
icy. An important property of such sys-
tems–the independence of the equilibri-
um allocation of allowances after trading
from the initial allocation27–permits the
legislature to distribute allowances in a
way that builds a constituency of political
support for enactment without jeopar-
dizing the policy’s environmental integ-
rity or its cost effectiveness.28
At the same time, it is important to rec-
ognize that those market-based policy
instruments that raise revenues for gov-
ernment–including taxes and auctioned
allowances–can have their own political
attraction, particularly at a time of chronic
government budgetary de½cits.
Any public policy, whether cost effec-
tive or not, will inevitably have signi½cant
distributional consequences, even if it
does no more than reinforce the status
quo. In the case of U.S. climate change
policy, the near-term distributional im-
pacts will primarily reflect the cost of
mitigating emissions. The climate bene-
½ts to any single nation from its emis-
sion-reduction efforts will be spread
globally and over several generations.
Any meaningful climate policy will in-
crease energy prices, particularly with
regard to energy derived from coal com-
bustion and, to a lesser extent, petroleum
and natural gas combustion. Mitigation
policies would also bene½t ½rms (and
some regions) with zero-carbon technol-
ogies, such as wind, solar, and energy ef½-
ciency technologies. The economic inci-
dence of energy price increases will make
up a considerable share of the distribution-
al impacts, which will vary across sectors
of the economy, across regions, and across
income groups. These impacts are also
likely to have profound political impacts
on the feasibility of climate policy and the
choice among climate policy instruments.
The political-economy implications of
the costs associated with various policy
instruments give public of½cials strong
incentive to identify and select policies
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costs. In some cases, policies and/or pol-
icy instruments may indeed be low-cost,
either because they are essentially unam-
bitious or because they are cost effective.
Another option is for public of½cials to
identify policy instruments that hide or
partially obscure their costs. Largely for
this reason, ordinary performance and
technology standards have long been
favored over market-based instruments.29
A prime example is the apparent political
attraction of Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standards as a means of in-
creasing the fuel ef½ciency of American
automobiles, in contrast with the political
aversion to gasoline taxes, even though
the latter would accomplish more at lower
cost (but in a highly visible manner).30
P ublic and political interest in a market-
based policy instrument may respond
positively to the threat of a high-cost reg-
ulatory alternative. The business com-
munity may prefer a more cost-effective
(and hence potentially lower-cost) mar-
ket-based policy to traditional command-
and-control regulation. Some in the envi-
ronmental community may also support
a cost-effective policy if it enables a more
ambitious environmental goal than is
possible under a conventional regulatory
mandate. 
During the policy debate over the 1990
Clean Air Act amendments, the prospect
of a costly regulatory standard for power
plant SO2emissions prompted interest in
a cap-and-trade regime that became the
centerpiece of the law’s approach to com-
bat acid rain. Building on the successful
experience with SO2 cap and trade, the
Environmental Protection Agency (epa)
worked with Northeastern, Mid-Atlantic,
and Midwestern states to design a nitro-
gen oxide emissions cap-and-trade pro-
gram to reduce ground-level ozone pollu-
tion (smog). While states had the option
to implement a conventional command-
and-control regulation in lieu of joining
the cap-and-trade regime, every state chose
to pursue the more cost-effective trading
approach. 
The threat of a high-cost regulatory
alternative for greenhouse gas emissions
could influence potential interest in a
market-based policy approach. First, the
epa could design regulations under the
existing Clean Air Act that include some
form of cap and trade or a variant of a
clean energy standard. While existing law
would circumscribe some potentially ap-
pealing attributes of a market-based cli-
mate policy (including revenue generation
and cost containment through a safety
valve) as well as prohibit a carbon tax
outright, it could allow for a more cost-
effective approach than conventional reg-
ulatory mandates. Second, the risk of a
politically (and potentially economical-
ly) unpalatable regulatory scheme under
the Clean Air Act may also mobilize in-
terest in a legislative alternative. 
P ursuing a legislative option through
Congress could involve a variety of leg-
islative committees that would engage a
range of special interests. Consider the
example of the Senate: a carbon-tax bill
would likely start in the Finance Com-
mittee; a cap-and-trade bill in the Envi-
ronment and Public Works (epw) Com-
mittee; and a clean energy standard bill
in the Energy and Natural Resources Com-
mittee. If a cap-and-trade or clean energy
standard bill raises signi½cant revenue, it
would likely be referred to the Finance
Committee, while any bill that modi½es
the Clean Air Act (for example, by substi-
tuting a market-based policy for existing
statutory authority) would likely be re-
ferred to the epw Committee. The com-
mittee that begins drafting a bill will
shape that bill in line with its priorities:
for example, the Finance Committee will
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will lay out ambitious environmental goals.
The persistence of policy design as a bill
moves through the legislative process
would result in a ½nal law reflecting those
initial efforts. 
A successful effort in designing and
implementing a market-based policy
would also bene½t from the positive ex-
periences on other policy fronts related
to the gradual increase in policy stringen-
cy. In 2008, British Columbia implement-
ed a carbon tax starting at $10 (Canadian
dollars) per ton of carbon dioxide and
climbing annually until it reaches $30/
tCO2in 2012. To complement this gradual
implementation of the policy, in the month
before tax collection began, the provin-
cial government provided checks to house-
holds representing the revenue expected
to be raised by the tax in the ½rst year. As
the carbon tax revenue has increased,
households and businesses have enjoyed
larger reductions in their income taxes. 
The SO2 cap-and-trade program was
phased in over two time periods, with the
largest power plants covered by the pro-
gram starting in 1995 and the balance of
the covered facilities entering the program
in 2000. The eu ets began with a pilot
phase in 2005 that imposed a relatively
lax emission cap to enable time for cov-
ered facilities and government regulators
to gain experience with the trading regime
before moving into a more stringent sec-
ond phase in 2008. State renewable elec-
tricity and alternative energy standards
have likewise started with relatively mod-
est goals: the average renewable target
for the twenty-four operational state pro-
grams in 2010 was about 4.7 percent, but
will increase by a factor of three by 2020.
T he U.S. political response to possible
market-based approaches to climate pol-
icy has been and will continue to be large-
ly a function of issues and structural fac-
tors that transcend the scope of environ-
mental and climate policy. Because a
truly meaningful climate policy–whether
market-based or conventional in design–
will have signi½cant impact on economic
activity in a wide variety of sectors (given
the pervasiveness of energy use in a mod-
ern economy) and in every region of the
country, it is not surprising that propos-
als for such policies bring forth signi½-
cant opposition, particularly during dif½-
cult economic times. 
In addition, U.S. political polarization
–which began some four decades ago 
and accelerated during the economic
downturn–has decimated what had long
been the key political constituency in
Congress for environmental (and energy)
action: namely, the middle, including
both moderate Republicans and moder-
ate Democrats.31 Whereas congressional
debates about environmental and energy
policy have long featured regional poli-
tics, they are now fully and simply parti-
san. In this political maelstrom, the fail-
ure of cap-and-trade climate policy in the
Senate in 2010 was collateral damage in a
much larger political war.
Better economic times may reduce the
pace–if not the direction–of political
polarization. Furthermore, the ongoing
challenge of large federal budgetary de½-
cits may at some point increase the polit-
ical feasibility of new sources of revenue.
When and if this happens, consumption
taxes (as opposed to traditional taxes on
income and investment) could receive
heightened attention; primary among
these might be energy taxes, which, de-
pending on their design, can be signi½-
cant climate policy instruments.
Some would argue that a mobilizing
event will soon precipitate U.S. climate
policy action. But the nature of the cli-
mate change problem itself helps explain
much of the relative apathy among the
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mobilizing event may come “too late.”
Nearly all our major environmental laws
have been passed in the wake of highly
publicized environmental events or “dis-
asters,” including the spontaneous com-
bustion of the Cuyahoga River in Cleve-
land, Ohio, in 1969, and the discovery of
toxic substances at Love Canal in Niagara
Falls, New York, in the mid-1970s. But note
that the day after the Cuyahoga River
caught on ½re, no article in The Cleveland
Plain Dealercommented that the cause was
uncertain, that rivers periodically catch
on ½re from natural causes. On the con-
trary, it was immediately apparent that the
cause was waste dumped into the river by
adjacent industries. A direct consequence
of the observed “disaster” was, of course,
the Clean Water Act of 1972.
Climate change is distinctly different.
Unlike the environmental threats ad-
dressed successfully in past U.S. legisla-
tion, climate change is essentially unob-
servable. We observe the weather, not the
climate. Until there is an obvious and
sudden event–such as a loss of part of
the Antarctic ice sheet leading to a dra-
matic sea-level rise–it is unlikely that
public opinion in the United States will
provide the bottom-up demand for action
that has inspired previous congressional
action on the environment over the past
forty years.
Despite this somewhat bleak assess-
ment of the politics of climate change
policy in the United States, it is much too
soon to speculate on what the future will
hold for the use of market-based policy
instruments, whether for climate change
or other environmental problems. On the
one hand, it is conceivable that two de-
cades (1988–2008) of high receptivity in
U.S. politics to cap and trade and offset
mechanisms will turn out to be no more
than a relatively brief departure from a
long-term trend of reliance on conven-
tional means of regulation. On the other
hand, it is also possible that the recent
tarnishing of cap and trade in national
political dialogue will itself turn out to be
a temporary departure from a long-term
trend of increasing reliance on market-
based environmental policy instruments.
Perhaps the ongoing interest in these pol-
icy mechanisms in California (Assembly
Bill 32), the Northeast (Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative), Europe, and other
countries will form a bridge to a changed
political climate in Washington.
57
Joseph E. 
Aldy & 
Robert N. 
Stavins
141 (2)  Spring 201258
Using the
Market to
Address
Climate
Change
Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences
endnotes
* Contributor Biographies: JOSEPH E. ALDY is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the
Harvard Kennedy School, a Nonresident Fellow of Resources for the Future, and a Faculty
Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research has been pub-
lished in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Jour-
nal of Environmental Economics and Management, among others. He is the coeditor of Post-
Kyoto International Climate Policy: Implementing Architectures for Agreement (with Robert Stavins,
2010) and Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World
(with Robert Stavins, 2007). 
ROBERT N. STAVINS is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government at the Har-
vard Kennedy School, a University Fellow of Resources for the Future, and a Research Asso-
ciate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research has appeared in the Amer-
ican Economic Review, the Journal of Economic Perspectives, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics,
among others. His edited books include Economics of the Environment: Selected Readings (6th
ed., 2012), Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Implementing Architectures for Agreement (with
Joseph Aldy, 2010), and Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the
Post-Kyoto World (with Joseph Aldy, 2007). 
1 Valerie A. Ramey and Daniel J. Vine, “Oil, Automobiles, and the U.S. Economy: How Much
Have Things Really Changed?” nber Working Paper No. 16067 (Cambridge, Mass.: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2010).
2 Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration, 2011).
3See David Popp, “Induced Innovation and Energy Prices,” American Economic Review 92 (1)
(2002): 160–180; and Richard G. Newell, Adam B. Jaffe, and Robert N. Stavins, “The In-
duced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 114 (3) (1999): 941–975.
4 Curtis Carlson, Dallas Burtraw, Maureen Cropper, and Karen Palmer, “SO2 Control by Elec-
tric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade?” Journal of Political Economy 108 (2000): 1292–
1326.
5 A. Denny Ellerman and Barbara K. Buchner, “The European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy
1 (1) (Winter 2007): 66–87.
6 Robert N. Stavins, “Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments,” in
Handbook of Environmental Economics, vol. 1, ed. Karl-Göran Mäler and Jeffrey Vincent (Am-
sterdam: Elsevier Science, 2003), chap. 9, 355–435.
7 For an example of a carbon tax proposal, see Gilbert E. Metcalf, “A Proposal for a U.S. Car-
bon Tax Swap,” The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-12 (Washington, D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution, 2007).
8 Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support Document: Social
Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866,” Washington,
D.C., 2010.
9 If society is highly risk averse and is facing uncertain future catastrophic risks, then the ef-
½cient carbon price might be so high initially that it would actually decline over time as un-
certainty is resolved. See Robert Litterman, “Pricing Climate Change Risk Appropriately,”
Financial Analysts Journal 67 (5) (2011).
10For example, U.S. petroleum re½neries pay an 8¢ oil spill liability tax on every barrel of crude
oil they re½ne. A carbon tax could piggyback on this existing tax. The government could col-
lect about $4.30 per barrel for every $10 per ton of CO2 of carbon tax at re½neries. The
administrative ease of employing existing tax infrastructure may be more important for the
design of developing-country mitigation policies. See Joseph E. Aldy, Eduardo Ley, and Ian59
Joseph E. 
Aldy & 
Robert N. 
Stavins
141 (2)  Spring 2012
W.H. Parry, “A Tax-Based Approach to Slowing Global Climate Change,” National Tax Journal
61 (2008): 493–517.
11 For an example of a cap-and-trade proposal, see Robert N. Stavins, “A U.S. Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Global Climate Change,” The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2007-13
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2007).
12 For a discussion of relevant trade policy and legal questions, see Lael Brainard and Isaac
Sorking, eds., Climate Change, Trade, and Competitiveness: Is a Collision Inevitable? (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009); and Jeffrey Frankel, “Global Environment and
Trade Policy,” in Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Implementing Architectures for Agree-
ment, ed. Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 493–529.
13 One proposal for a clean energy standard is discussed in Joseph E. Aldy, “Promoting Clean
Energy in the American Power Sector,” The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2011-04
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2011).
14 See The Effects of Renewable or Clean Electricity Standards (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congres-
sional Budget Of½ce, July 2011).
15 See American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, S. 1462, 111th Cong., sec. 132; Practical
Energy and Climate Plan Act of 2010, S. 3464, 111th Cong., sec. 301; and President Obama’s
2011 State of the Union address. 
16 Lawrence H. Goulder and Ian W.H. Parry, “Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy,”
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 2 (2) (2008): 152–174.
17 See Martin L. Weitzman, “Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies 41 (1974): 477–
491.
18 See Lawrence H. Goulder, “Environmental Taxation and the ‘Double Dividend’: A Reader’s
Guide,” International Tax and Public Finance 2 (2) (August 1995).
19 See Goulder and Parry, “Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy.”
20See Lawrence H. Goulder and Robert N. Stavins, “Challenges from State-Federal Interac-
tions in U.S. Climate Change Policy,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 101 (3)
(2011): 253–257; and Meghan McGuinness and A. Denny Ellerman, “The Effects of Inter-
actions between Federal and State Climate Policies,” Working Paper WP-2008-004, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2008.
21 See Carolyn Fischer and Louis Preonas, “Combining Policies for Renewable Energy: Is the
Whole Less than the Sum of Its Parts?” International Review of Environmental and Resource
Economics 4 (1) (2010): 51–92; Arik Levinson, “Interactions Among Climate Policy Regula-
tions,” nber Working Paper No. 16109 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2010); and Environment Directorate, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Interactions Between Emission Trading Systems and Other Overlapping Policy In-
struments (Paris: oecd, 2011).
22See Judson Jaffe, Matthew Ranson, and Robert Stavins, “Linking Tradable Permit Systems:
A Key Element of Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture,” Ecology Law Quarterly
36 (2010): 789–808.
23 See Richard N. Cooper, “The Case for Charges on Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” in Post-Kyoto
International Climate Policy, ed. Aldy and Stavins, 151–178.
24See Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, What Has the Kyoto Protocol Wrought? The Real
Architecture of International Tradable Permit Markets (Washington, D.C.: aei Press, 1999). 
25 See Gilbert E. Metcalf and David Weisbach, “Linking Policies When Tastes Differ: Global
Climate Policy in a Heterogeneous World,” Discussion Paper 2010-38, Harvard Project on
International Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Har-
vard Kennedy School, July 2010.60
Using the
Market to
Address
Climate
Change
Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences
26See Nathaniel Keohane, Richard Revesz, and Robert Stavins, “The Choice of Regulatory In-
struments in Environmental Policy,” Harvard Environmental Law Review 22 (2) (1998): 313–
367. 
27 See David W. Montgomery, “Markets in Licenses and Ef½cient Pollution Control Programs,”
Journal of Economic Theory 5 (3) (1972): 395–418.
28There are, however, certain circumstances in which this independence axiom fails; see
Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, “The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-
Trade System Performance,” The Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming). In some cases,
the tax-interaction and revenue-recycling impacts of the choice of free allowance allocation
could signi½cantly undermine cost effectiveness; see Lawrence H. Goulder, Ian W.H. Parry,
Roberton C. Williams III, and Dallas Burtraw, “The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instru-
ments for Environmental Protection in a Second-Best Setting,” Journal of Public Economics 72
(1999): 329–360.
29See Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins, “The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental
Policy.”
30 See Robert Crandall, “Policy Watch: Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 6 (1992): 171–180; and Mark R. Jacobsen, “Evaluating U.S. Fuel Econ-
omy Standards in a Model with Producer and Household Heterogeneity,” working paper,
Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, September 2010.
31 See Robert N. Stavins, “Polarized Politics Paralyze Policy,” The Environmental Forum 28 (6)
(November/December 2011): 16.